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Americans are increasingly secular, following the trends of their counterparts in other 
advanced democracies. Still, religion and morality continue to play a strong role in our politics. 
Particularly in 2016, there was a strong focus on white evangelical Christians and their 
overwhelming support for Donald Trump, whose behavior and rhetoric seemed divorced from 
conservative Christian beliefs. Evangelicals have been the stalwart party faithful for the GOP for 
decades, and, even as some scholars warn the “end of white Christian America” is near (Jones 
2016), the fusion of Christian nationalism and white identity (Whitehead, Perry and Baker 2018; 
Jardina 2019) may persist even as formal religious participation declines.  
One way to uncover the persistent role of religion across generations is to look past 
traditional understandings of religious belief and denominational belonging and examine the 
presence of bedrock principles that could influence political beliefs in families. The Moral 
Foundations framework (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009) was developed for this purpose – to 
describe human behavior and attitudes in the moral realm without relying upon country, culture, 
or time specific labels. Specifically, the five Foundations – Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, 
Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity -- have been used to explain differences 
between liberals and conservatives regarding political ideology as well as religious beliefs 
(Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Koleva et al. 2012; McAdams et al. 2008). I am interested in 
understanding whether these foundational principles help explain how political and religious 
beliefs are transmitted in families.  
In a rare look at political and social attitudes in three, related generations, I surveyed 
college students, their parents, and grandparents about their political attitudes and Moral 
Foundations. The Foundations are not equally shared across generations as preferences for each 
Foundation increase with the age of the cohorts in this sample, and there are especially large 
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differences on Authority and Purity, such that the grandparents in these families rate these 
Foundations as more important in moral decision making. A follow-up survey sent to 
participants at a later time period reveals that the Moral Foundations of individuals may not be 
particularly stable across even short periods of time. These findings suggest that the political 
appeals that may work on older Americans may be less effective on the younger generations. For 
example, older Americans may see same-sex marriage and trans-gender rights as Purity issues. 
In turn, given stronger attitudes on Purity, framing these issues in that way can shape public 
opinion. Alternatively, younger generations may be less interested in Purity concerns and may 
view LGBTQ rights in the realm of Fairness. If individuals indeed make moral decisions based 
on these types of bedrock principles, understanding which of these principles or Foundations 
drive particular age groups can help us better understand shifts in public opinion.  
Moral Foundations and Political Attitudes 
The Moral Foundations theory suggests there are five dimensions in how individuals 
make moral decisions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, 
and Purity/Sanctity. The five dimensions of moral decision making are described as automatic, 
culturally widespread, demonstrate an “innate preparedness,” and are consistent with notions of 
evolutionary adaptive advantages (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, and Ditto 2013; 
Haidt and Graham 2007). Haidt (2012) explains the origins and development of these 
Foundations are a combination of innate human tendencies and cultural/societal/religious 
teachings in one’s upbringing and throughout the life course. These dimensions are uncovered by 
asking individuals a series of questions along these lines: “when you decide whether something 
is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”1 
• Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Harm) 																																																								
1 A complete list of questions and the answer key can be found at www.moralfoundations.org. 
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• Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (Fairness) 
• Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country (Loyalty) 
• Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (Authority) 
• Whether or not someone did something disgusting (Purity) 
 
When applied to the political spectrum, ideological liberals and conservatives both rely upon 
Harm and Fairness intuitions in moral judgments, but conservatives also endorse notions of 
Loyalty, Authority and Purity in their decisions (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Graham et al. 
2013). This partially explains why liberals and conservatives seem to talk past one another – 
Fairness and Harm usually outweigh the other moral considerations for liberals whereas 
conservatives rely on all five dimensions equally. Extending individual moral decision-making to 
political attitudes, Koleva, Graham, Haidt, Iyer, and Ditto (2012) discover that the Moral 
Foundations are predictive of certain “culture war” issues (Hunter 1991) that are often grounded 
in religious beliefs. These types of issues – abortion, gay marriage, the death penalty – polarize 
Americans, both politically and religiously (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988; Carmines and 
Layman 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001). A common thread underlying this 
culture divide is a general set of preferences on social order and behavior. On one side are 
orthodox individuals who believe in unchanging moral codes emanating from an authoritative 
source while progressives adhere to an ever-evolving understanding of the human condition and 
associated morality (Koleva et al. 2012; Hunter 1991). Orthodox folks may cling to the 
Constitution (politically), the Bible (religiously), and tradition (patriarchy) as a way to solve 
society’s ills, and progressives advocate a “modern, liberationist, or relativist position” to 
address ever-changing circumstances (Koleva et al. 2012).  
Analyzing all five Moral Foundations components, Koleva et al. (2012) predicted 
participants’ personal disapproval of the culture war issues, with Harm and Purity demonstrating 
the strongest relationships. Purity was associated with disagreement on sexual issues (e.g. casual 
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sex and same-sex marriage) as well as “sanctity of life” issues (e.g. stem-cell research and 
abortion) (Koleva et al. 2012), and Harm was associated with disapproval of the death penalty 
and medical testing of animals. These results make sense in that an individual’s Moral 
Foundations create personal notions of right and wrong, but often times we are able to separate 
those personal preferences from dictating decisions for everyone in society. The consistent 
evidence of Moral Foundations predicting right-left, liberal-conservative differences (Graham et 
al. 2013) suggest this theoretical framework and measurement tool is quite valuable for political 
scientists seeking to understand the origins of ideology and issue attitudes and helps move us 
beyond the low predictability of one-dimensional ideology.   
If Moral Foundations can be thought of as a measure of first principles that influence 
downstream attitudes like political preferences, what are the origins of the Foundations 
themselves? Haidt (2012) suggests some of these Foundations are present at birth, as even 
infants seem to display an innate sense of Fairness, while the other Foundations can be learned 
through cultural or religious instruction. Indeed, Djupe and Friesen (2018) find that American 
clergy members espouse Moral Foundations that reflect the left-right theological positions of 
their religious traditions, but there is variation to when they subscribe to the “binding” 
foundations of Purity, Loyalty and Authority and when they appeal to the “individualizing” 
foundations of Harm and Fairness.  
What has been previously unexplored is whether these Foundations are shared in families 
and across generations, similar to political or religious beliefs. Indeed, in a comprehensive 
collection of Moral Foundation findings, current state of the measurement paradigm and 
response to criticisms, Graham et al. (2013) make a call for developmental psychologists to 
examine the development and possible shifts in these Foundations throughout childhood and the 
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life course. In keeping with the major findings in political socialization studies, a trait or attitude 
like a first principle Moral Foundation would seem a likely candidate for generational 
transmission.  
Family Socialization 
Most of the political socialization literature focuses on partisanship, political interest and 
participation or attitudes on issues of the day (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Jennings, Stoker and 
Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). This literature notes that the most successful 
transmission corresponds to “when the parents’ political views are crystallized, stable, and 
communicated via consistent cues over long stretches of time” (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 
2009, 788). After children had left the home, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found the strongest 
parent-child agreement on political preferences that had religious components associated with 
emotion and tradition. Most socialization scholars explain these results with the powerful, 
consistent parental cues that often accompany moral issue attitudes (Jennings, Stoker and 
Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). In addition, the strength of parental socialization 
depends upon the importance of an issue to the parent and how correctly a child identifies a 
parent’s position (Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). Because socialization is “low-key and haphazard” 
(Jennings and Niemi 1974, 330), it may be more likely that general values or “broad 
orientations” (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009, 166), like Moral Foundations, are more 
successfully transmitted than specific issues of the day, though the general orientations may lead 
to agreement in some of the latter attitudes. There is also evidence that religious and political 
beliefs could derive from heritable traits reflective of bedrock principles (Friesen and 
Ksiazkiewicz 2015), though Moral Foundations themselves appear to be products of 
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environmental learning and socialization rather than heritable traits and may not be stable across 
time (Smith et al. 2017).  
Nearly all of the political socialization studies involve parent-child dyads, but this paper 
extends the unit analysis to include grandparents, a rarity in political science studies. The logic 
behind adding a third generation is to determine whether a “multiplier effect” exists, in that when 
paternal and maternal grandparents agree on political and religious preferences, mothers and 
fathers will agree and then be more likely to act as “middlepersons” in relaying these values to 
the third generation (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 156; Beck and Jennings 1975). Unfortunately, 
because of the data limitations of my sample, I am unable to model these relationships on both 
sides of the family with mothers and fathers and their respective parents, as there are only eight 
families where there is data for college students (G3), mothers and fathers (G2, and maternal and 
paternal grandparents (G1). As such, the following hypotheses will reflect a proxy to these 
relationships by examining the association between the third generation, each parent and each set 
of grandparents. Thus, the relationships will be examined in aggregate across the sample because 
I am unable to model full family relationships. If there are positive associations between the 
generations’ preferences, however, this may suggest a multiplier effect could be occurring in that 
parents (G2) enter marriage with shared preferences from their parents (G1), and then agreement 
with their spouse may increase the likelihood of agreement with their children (G3). But without 
modeling each family unit across generations on both sides of the family, a true test of the 
multiplier effect is not possible.  
In addition, recent studies have suggested that children are more likely to share political 
preferences with their mothers because they tend to spend more time with them (Zuckerman et 
al. 2007); yet earlier studies indicated that fathers were the purveyors of these political 
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orientations (Beck and Jennings 1975). Because there are not consistent theoretical findings on 
such gender effects and the majority of the measures in this paper have not been examined across 
three generations, the hypotheses will not reflect directionality or strength of relationship based 
upon parental gender and/or side of the family. That is, I do not expect that fathers will exert 
more influence on their children than mothers or paternal grandparents more than maternal 
grandparents, but the statistical tests of the hypotheses will be divided by sides of the family to 
try to approximate the “multiplier effect” of intergenerational agreement and explore possible 
maternal/paternal differences. Finally, the only three-generation study of political preferences 
(Beck and Jennings 1975) indicated that generations nearest one another (Generation 1 and 
Generation 2, Generation 2 and Generation 3) are more likely to agree than those furthest apart 
(Generation 1 and Generation 3) because of the significant difference in level of contact. 
Because Moral Foundations Theory posits that these are stable, enduring first principles for 
individuals and across a population, there should be no difference in the scores between 
generations.  
Sample and Methods 
 
 In January 2011, undergraduates at a Midwestern university were sent an email inviting 
them to participate in an online survey about religion and politics. The invitation included a link 
to Qualtrics.com where individuals completed the 20-minute survey in exchange for course 
credit. The survey was repeated in September 2011 by having students take the survey at a 
computer lab on campus. The total sample included 583 subjects, after dropping those who did 
not complete the entire questionnaire, international students2, three participants whose ages 
(greater than 45) indicated they were not representative of this population and 75 individuals 																																																								
2 The political questions in the survey are based upon the U.S. system, culture and society and may not be applicable to 
individuals from other nations.  
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who did not “pass” the survey accuracy check detailed below. The sample is split almost equally 
between genders (281 males, 302 females), with an average age of 19.5 years and a median 
family income of $80,001 to $100,000. Ninety-six percent of participants are single, 93% 
identify as white/Caucasian and there is a fair division between those who grew up on a rural 
farm (16%), in a rural town (23%), in a suburban (29%) or urban area (28%).  
In order to create a three-generation sample, the spring 2011 subjects were asked to 
voluntarily provide the names and addresses of their parents and grandparents; after receiving a 
National Science Foundation grant for the project, the fall 2011 subjects were given $5 for 
providing this same information. A professional survey organization was contracted to design 
and mail surveys to the parents of the subjects. In the first mailing, a self-addressed stamped 
envelope and $2 were included as a thank you incentive for completing the questionnaire (Singer 
et al. 1999; Warriner et al. 1996). A few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was mailed to 
those who had not yet returned the questionnaire. At the end of this survey, the parent subjects 
were asked to provide contact information for their parents. This information was combined with 
the grandparent names and addresses already obtained from the student subjects, and the 
grandparents were mailed surveys, with a self-addressed stamped envelope and a $2 incentive. A 
few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was mailed. These series of surveys were mailed, 
completed and returned between November 2011 and February 2012. With a 64% response rate, 
the parent sample included 227 individuals, which were 53% female and 99% white, with an 
average age of 50.41, a median income of $80,001 to $100,000 and median education of “college 
graduate.” The grandparent sample contains 102 individuals, a 67% response rate, which were 
68% female and 99% white, with an average age of 73.25, a median income of $60,001 to 
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$80,000 and median education of “some college.” Coding and explanation of the key variables 
are listed below, with summary statistics displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Moral Foundations and Demographics 
 
 
Moral Foundations. A 20-item questionnaire was used to measure an individual’s Moral 
Foundations’ scores (www.moralfoundations.org). For the first set of items, participants were 
asked to rate statements from “not at all relevant” (1) to “extremely relevant” (5) to whether the 
consideration in question influences their judgments of right and wrong. Two statements are tied 
to each of the five Moral Foundations, as indicated in the Appendix. This set also included an 
item, which tested for accuracy and full use of the scale: “Whether or not someone was good at 
math.” Thirty-six individuals scored a four (“somewhat relevant”) or above and were dropped 
from the analysis. The second set of questions provided a list of statements with which 
  Student (G3) Parent (G2) Grandparent (G1) 
Harm M=4.30, SD=.79 M=4.35, SD=.81 M=4.71, SD=.73 
Fairness M=4.50, SD=.73 M=4.54, SD=.75 M=4.95, SD=.65 
Ingroup M=4.29, SD=.79 M=4.26, SD=.81 M=4.95, SD=.65 
Authority M=4.09, SD=.76 M=4.26, SD=.77 M=4.72, SD=.66 
Purity M=3.69, SD=.90 M=4.27, SD=.95 M=4.77, SD=.73 
Age M=19.48, SD=1.74 M=50.42 SD=6.05 M=73.25, SD=6.20 
Income Median=$80,001 to $100,000 
Median=$80,001 to 
$100,000 
Median=$60,001 to 
$80,000 
Education Median=Some college 
Median=College 
graduate Median=Some college 
Sex 48% Male 52% Female 
47% Male 
53% Female 
32% Male 
68% Female 
N 583 225 94 
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participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement – “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (6), as well as an item response check --“It is better to do good than to do bad” 
– and individuals who slightly disagreed through strongly disagreed were dropped. When 
combined with the math item, a total of 75 participants were removed from this measure.3  
Because of the small sample size from the parent and grandparent generations, individuals were 
only removed from the analysis if they “inaccurately” marked both the “math” and “good” items; 
this resulted in dropping one case in the parent sample and zero cases in the grandparent sample. 
Conforming to Haidt and Graham’s coding scheme,4 the scores for the four statements per Moral 
Foundation were averaged.  
The data files from all three samples were combined into one dataset where one row 
represents a family unit, including the variables for students, the mother and/or father and the 
maternal and/or paternal grandparents. To examine the transmission of Moral Foundations and 
political beliefs across generations, I created separate models for maternal and paternal relatives. 
Regarding the grandparent measures, the score from one grandparent will be used if the other 
one is not present, and their scores will be averaged if they are both present. For example, if a 
maternal grandmother answered the survey but the maternal grandfather did not, her score on 
Harm will be used in the models. In the matched family sample, there are 100 biological 
mothers, 117 biological fathers, two adoptive mothers, eight stepparents, 43 maternal 
grandmothers, 20 maternal grandfathers, 26 paternal grandmothers, and 13 paternal grandfathers. 
For the purposes of the following analyses, only biological relatives were included.  
If Moral Foundations are enduring, innate belief systems, formed by our social worlds, and 
reflect the types of beliefs that are often successfully transmitted in families, then we would 																																																								
3 Dropping these cases did not substantially alter the demographic make-up of this sample.  
4 www.moralfoundations.org 
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expect that the college students, their parents and grandparents would report similar preferences 
for the five Foundations.  
Hypothesis 1: Moral Foundation scores will be positively related within families. 
 
Table 2 displays the bivariate relationships of Moral Foundations between the student, his or 
her mother and his or her maternal grandparents. Table 3 displays these same correlations for the 
paternal side. There are significant, positive relationships between Harm, Fairness, Authority and 
Purity for parents (G2) and the college students (G3) in the maternal family sample, but only 
Ingroup and Authority reach traditional significance levels between G2 and G3 on the paternal 
side. A possible explanation for these findings is that women tend to score higher on Harm, 
Fairness and Purity and therefore may be more likely to pass these Foundations along to their 
children (Graham et al. 2011). Ingroup views are the only shared relationship on one Moral 
Foundation between G1 and G3. On the paternal side, G1 Purity is positively associated with G3 
Purity, but the Ingroup scores are negatively associated between the two generations. More 
relationships emerge between the five Moral Foundations across generations than within them. 
For example, Fairness in G1 is significantly related to Ingroup views in G3.  
Regarding the relationships between G1 and G2, no significant relationships emerge on the 
maternal side, but with small to medium effect sizes (r=-.17 to .23), there is most likely a power 
problem with the small sample. Furthermore, the relationships are not even all in the expected 
direction, as Harm, Fairness and Ingroup are negatively related. Similar puzzling results occur in 
the paternal G1-G2 correlations, as the nonsignificant relationships demonstrate decent effect 
sizes (r=.08 to -.39), but in positive and negative directions. When the G3 sample is split by 
gender, the relationships between mothers in G2 and children in G3 shift a little bit but stay in 
the same general direction, with sons demonstrating stronger relationships than daughters with 
	 13	
their mothers. No relationships, apart from a nearly significant association in Ingroup attitudes 
between fathers and sons, emerge on the paternal side when splitting G3 by gender. Though this 
finding supports work that demonstrates men score higher on the Ingroup/Loyalty dimension, 
which can explain phenomena such as higher levels of sports team loyalty and fandom 
(Winegard and Deaner 2010).  
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and 
their mothers (G2) and maternal grandparents (G1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
G3               
1. Harm               
2. Fairness .60              
3. Ingroup .11 .20             
4. 
Authority .10 .18 .56            
5. Purity .21 .17 .41 .52           
               
G2               
6. Harm .37 .13 -.18 -.01 .15          
7. Fairness .21 .19 -.09 .09 .06 .58         
8. Ingroup .13 .00 .08 .19 .25 .50 .40        
9. 
Authority .06 .05 .27 .31 .29 .24 .19 .51       
10. Purity .01 -.06 .11 .33 .37 .19 .13 .42 .62      
               
G1                
11. Harm .19 -.06 .17 .09 .24 -.17 -.09 -.17 -.04 -.16     
12. 
Fairness .00 -.11 .43 .34 .15 -.16 -.09 -.11 .08 -.29 .64    
13. 
Ingroup -.02 .12 .48 .28 .07 -.18 .08 -.19 .17 -.35 .56 .78   
14. 
Authority -.16 .10 .08 .09 .12 .14 .11 .33 .24 .41 .19 .15 .35  
15. Purity -.36 -.03 .11 .14 .09 -.26 -.09 .21 .29 .23 .24 .02 .32 .63 
Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2 
relationships ranges from 88 to 91, G2-G1 ranges from 19 to 23 and G3-G1 ranges from 34 to 
38. 
 
 
 
 
 
	 15	
Table 3: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and 
their fathers (G2) and paternal grandparents (G1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
G3               
1. Harm               
2. Fairness .60              
3. Ingroup .11 .20             
4. 
Authority .10 .18 .56            
5. Purity .21 .17 .41 .52           
               
G2               
6. Harm .06 -.01 -.01 -.10 -.06          
7. Fairness .06 .07 -.02 -.08 -.03 .72         
8. Ingroup -.07 .01 .22 .18 .13 .41 .47        
9. 
Authority -.09 -.08 .21 .16 .07 .33 .36 .56       
10. Purity -.05 -.14 .06 .12 .18 .27 .28 .47 .66      
               
G1               
11. Harm -.10 -.14 -.01 .01 -.03 .37 .26 .01 -.12 -.09     
12. 
Fairness .17 .20 -.24 -.04 .02 .17 .08 -.37 -.52 -.58 .64    
13. 
Ingroup .04 .19 -.13 .26 .19 .19 .31 -.39 -.38 -.41 .54 .75   
14. 
Authority -.11 -.27 .00 .21 .20 .04 .20 -.05 -.28 -.04 .69 .54 .62  
15. Purity .06 -.19 .17 .47 .61 -.07 -.13 -.21 -.44 -.17 .33 .39 .39 .52 
Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2 
relationships ranges from 99 to 103, G2-G1 ranges from 14 to 16 and G3-G1 ranges from 25 to 
26. 
 
Because the relationships do not form a coherent pattern, it is difficult to speculate about any 
sort of multiplier effect or parents acting as middlepersons, relaying values between generations. 
Examining the correlations between mothers and fathers in G2 may be part of the answer: the 
only Moral Foundation relationship that achieves traditional levels of statistical significance is 
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Purity (r=.24, p<.05). Harm, Fairness and Ingroup display positive relationships between parents 
at the .10 level, but all demonstrate low effect sizes (right around .2). This supports earlier 
literature that the most successful transmission occurs between attitudes that are shared by both 
parents (Jennings and Niemi 1974). That is, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported in that some 
Moral Foundations are passed down in families, but this may be moderated by parental 
agreement. One possibility for the sporadic relationships could be due to differences in means 
across the generations, which would be contrary to Hypothesis 2. That is, if Moral Foundations 
run in families and are persistent across the life course, then the distribution of preferences for 
each Foundations should be similar across each generation.   
Hypothesis 2: Each generation will have the same mean (average) score on each Moral 
Foundation. 
Two-sample, unpaired t tests were performed on the Moral Foundation measures between 
generations, displayed in Table 4. There were significant mean differences between scores on 
nearly all of the Moral Foundations between college students (G3) and both sets of grandparents 
and between grandparents (G1) and the parents (G2), with higher scores corresponding with age 
of the generation. That is, the grandparents rated nearly every Moral Foundation higher than G2 
and G3, regarding its relevance in making moral decisions. Parents and children in G2 and G3 
demonstrated more similar scores on the Foundations, with Authority and Purity both 
demonstrating higher means for mothers and fathers as compared to their children. This suggests 
that perhaps concerns for Authority and Purity increase with one’s age or may be a remnant of 
period effects.  
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Table 4: Two-sample T Tests of Moral Foundations between college students (G3), their 
parents (G2) and grandparents (G1) 
 Significant 
Mean 
Difference 
No Mean 
Difference 
G1: Maternal 
G2: Mother 
Harm 
Fairness 
Ingroup 
Authority 
Purity 
 
G2: Mother 
G3: Student 
Authority 
Purity 
Harm 
Fairness 
Ingroup 
G1: Maternal 
G3: Student 
Harm 
Ingroup 
Authority 
Purity 
Fairness 
   
G1: Paternal 
G2: Father 
Fairness 
Ingroup 
Authority 
Purity 
Harm 
 
G2: Father 
G3: Student 
Harm 
Purity 
Authority 
Fairness 
Ingroup 
G1: Paternal 
G3: Student 
Harm 
Ingroup 
Authority 
Purity 
Fairness 
   
Note: p < .05 
If Moral Foundations are not necessarily stable across generations, are they stable across 
time?  
Hypothesis 3: Moral Foundation scores at time 1 and time 2 will be the same. 
Though the best test would be longitudinal data similar to that collected by Jennings and 
Niemi across several decades, I sought to test whether these attitudes were stable within a year’s 
time. At the end of the first questionnaire, the parents and grandparents were asked for their 
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contact information if they were interested in participating in future research, and 182 individuals 
were mailed surveys and another $2 bill in the summer of 2012. With a response rate of 70%, 74 
parents and 54 grandparents completed the MF battery and some additional questions for the 
second time. The purpose of this second wave was to determine the relative stability of these 
belief sets. Beginning with Moral Foundations, the five indices from wave 1 were significantly 
correlated with their respective indices in wave 2, ranging from r = .60 for Fairness and r = .80 
for Purity, nearly mirroring Graham et al.’s (2011) test-retest results on 123 undergraduates. 
They conclude that “item responses are quite stable over time and that within-occasion variation 
is more a function of the broad diversity of measurement rather than instability” (Graham et al. 
2011, 371). Yet, if there are significant mean differences in a test-retest situation, we may be 
better able to uncover what types of characteristics, life stages or experiences contribute to the 
development of the Foundations.  
To test Hypothesis 3, I conducted repeated measure ANOVAs5 for each of the five Moral 
Foundations. Results are displayed in Table 5. There are no mean differences across time for 
Fairness or Ingroup preferences, but the other three Foundations demonstrated mean differences 
at the .10 significance level, though the latter is a more liberal test than the traditional .05, the 
small sample sizes indicate a probable power problem. These results suggest that Harm, 
Authority and Purity may be less stable across time, and provide support for other studies that 
find lower longitudinal correlations for Moral Foundations as compared to political orientations 
(Smith et al. 2017). Perhaps the issue here is that individuals do not uniformly prefer each Moral 
																																																								
5 Hilbe, Joseph. 1998. "RANOVA: Stata module to estimate single factor repeated measures ANOVA," Statistical 
Software Components S341201, Boston College Department of Economics. 
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Foundation. That is, are liberals more stable on the individualizing Foundations and 
conservatives on the binding Foundations?  
Table 5: Mean Differences between self-reported Moral Foundations at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 All Liberals Conservatives 
Harm F=3.12, p=.08 F=12.48, p=.002 F=.21, p=.65 
Fairness F=.18, p=.673 F=1.72, p=.202 F=1.87, p=.176 
Ingroup F=.09, p=.769 F= 0, p=1.0 F=.54, p=.466 
Authority F=2.88, p=.092 F=.03, p=.875 F=6.51, p=.013 
Purity F=2.98, p=.087 F=.83, p=.373 F=3.04, p=.086 
N 112-118 22-26 63-66 
Note: Repeated measures ANOVA performed with Stata’s “ranova.” 
Political Ideology. There has been some evidence that Moral Foundations can be 
manipulated; for example, a recent study on cognition and the Foundations suggests that when 
under cognitive stress, conservatives suppress the binding Foundations of Ingroup, Authority and 
Purity and are more likely to highlight concerns of Harm and Fairness, similar to their liberal 
counterparts (Wright and Baril 2011), though this was not replicated on two separate follow-up 
samples (Graham et al. 2013). On the other hand, using implicit association tests, Graham (2010) 
found that liberals implicitly endorse the binding Foundations that they normally eschew 
explicitly. The current study does not employ an experimental manipulation, but it might be 
possible that the binding Foundations are less stable or that political conservatives may be more 
malleable in these preferences. To test this assumption, I divided the sample into liberals and 
conservatives using a 7-point, self-placement scale ranging from Extremely Liberal (1) to 
Extremely Conservative (7). Those scoring 1 through 3 (slightly liberal) were coded 0; 
moderates (4) were dropped and slightly conservative (5) through extremely conservative (7) 
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were coded as 1. Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed again with results displayed in 
Table V. Even with the very small sample of liberals, there was a significant mean difference 
between Harm scores at time 1 and time 2, which seems to be driving the overall relationship 
reported in column 1 as there is no difference for conservatives. Likewise, the pattern of 
significant mean differences for Authority and Purity are driven by the significant differences for 
conservatives.  
To account for possible other factors that may influence the difference across time, I 
computed an absolute value difference score between each Foundation at time 1 and the 
respective Foundation at time 2, and regressed ideology (the full 7-point scale), age, income, 
education and gender on the resulting variable. None of the models reached statistical 
significance and thus cannot be interpreted. In looking at bivariate relationships between these 
variables, there was a significant negative correlation between the difference of Harm scores at 
T1 and T2 and income, such that increases in income results in closer scores between the two 
time periods (r = -.18, p = .057) and a significant positive relationship between the Purity 
difference score and education, in that increases in education are associated with greater 
differences in the scores (r = .20, p = .039). It isn’t clear why participants with higher incomes 
would have more stable Harm scores or those with high levels of education demonstrate more 
movement on Purity, and without consistent relationships across all five Foundations, it may not 
be prudent to draw conclusions from these possibly spurious correlations.  
Discussion 
In sum, there are stronger relationships between the generations closest to one another (G1-
G2 and G2-G3) than between generations one and three, which is consistent with previous three-
generation findings on political items (Beck and Jennings 1975). It is possible that some of the 
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relationships are mediated by demographic variables, such as income and education, or relational 
variables measuring level of contact between the generations. With the limitations of the small 
sample size due to incomplete three-generation triads, it is difficult to model these added 
parameters without jeopardizing already precious degrees of freedom. In addition, the G3 
population is nearly identical on individual-level socio-economic status so should the model 
include the education and income of the parents or the grandparents? There is a dearth of theory 
as to whether demographic variables influence transmission of attitudes across three generations. 
With sample sizes ranging from 14 to 103 in the between-generation correlations, it is also 
difficult to determine whether these associations, or lack thereof, are due to actual differences in 
the participants and samples or due to statistical problems that plague small samples, such as 
measurement error. This is the first known examination of Moral Foundations across three 
generations, and even with challenges of measurement error and sample size, this analysis 
demonstrates that some aspects of moral intuition belief sets are transmitted within families. The 
higher agreement between adjacent generations also hints at the possibility of both sides of the 
family in G1 and G2 spouses may serve as multipliers in the passage of these values to children 
in G3.  
What seems to be happening in the current data is some sort of age effect: concerns for each 
Foundation increases with the age of the cohorts in this sample, and there are especially large 
differences on Authority and Purity, such that the grandparents find these Foundations most 
relevant. This theoretical framework used in this paper conceptualizes Moral Foundations as a 
stable and universal set of dimensions, as is posited in Moral Foundations Theory, though its 
authors are usually quick to point out we know little of the origins or development of these 
beliefs and the Foundations are a “first draft” of innate preparedness that is continually edited by 
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one’s environment (Graham et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013). The findings in this paper offer 
evidence that these intuitive ethical systems may change with age or are significantly influenced 
by the larger cultural context of generational cohorts. In most of the Moral Foundations Theory 
work, age is used as an independent variable, along with Moral Foundations, in predicting 
another variable of interest. There have been no long-term longitudinal studies to determine 
whether Moral Foundations are stable across one’s life course, similar to the Big 5 Personality 
traits, or if they change over time. That is, when the G3 students of the current study become 
parents and eventually grandparents, will their concerns for Purity and Authority increase? Or 
will each cohort moving forward, at least in modernizing societies, have less and less concern for 
the binding foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity?  
For example, the Pew Research Center (June 8, 2015) reports an age divide for support 
for same-sex marriage, with 73% of Millennials (born after 1980) in favor, as compared to 59% 
of Generation X (born 1965-1980), 45% of Baby Boomers (1946-1964) and 39% of the Silent 
Generation (1928-1945).6 Support for gay marriage has been associated with notions of purity 
and attitudes toward disgust (Inbar et al. 2009a; Smith et al. 2010; Balzer and Jacobs 2011); so is 
it the case that younger individuals are not as concerned with purity or that they do not associate 
gay marriage with disgust/purity? If the latter is the case, then broad orientations may be 
transmitted within families but manifest themselves differently when applied to issues of the day.  
Several previous studies have demonstrated that value transmission is enhanced when 
parental views match the public mood or surrounding society (Jennings and Niemi 1974). Some 
																																																								
6 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. June 8, 2015. “Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but 
Key Segments Remain Opposed.” http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/support-for-same-sex-marriage-at-
record-high-but-key-segments-remain-opposed/ 
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issue attitudes, like race relations, seem to be shaped more by societal influences, or the 
prevailing “Zeitgeist,” if it is in opposition to parental views (Beck and Jennings 1991, 757; 
Niemi and Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1974). For example, Jennings and Niemi (1974) 
found the largest discrepancies between parent and child attitudes on issues like busing and 
segregation – civil rights issues that definitely have a generational component similar to that of 
gay rights today. What is unknown, then, is whether different generations apply different Moral 
Foundations to their political preferences and if this can help explain generational shifts in public 
opinion. When thinking about gay marriage, do the G3 individuals rely upon notions of Fairness 
and G1 on notions of Purity? Indeed, differences between generations on the “binding” 
Foundations suggest that Harm and Fairness concerns may be more relevant to younger 
generations than notions of Authority and Purity, yet the older generations seem to score at 
relatively the same level for all five Foundations. Attitudes toward gay marriage are changing 
within generations as support for gay marriage has increased over the past 10 years in each 
cohort, which may reflect arguments that emphasize the issue as a civil right – shifting the frame 
from purity and traditional values to appeals to fairness and equality.  
These Moral Foundations may be learned – and possibly unlearned – but some 
individuals may have a propensity to endorse certain Foundations that then must be activated by 
one’s culture, religious exposure and family. Then when individuals do not agree with one of 
these externalities (e.g. their parents or grandparents), there may be a hierarchy of influence at 
work that results in something like a cohort effect. Understanding the development and possible 
change in these Foundations may help illuminate how public opinion can shift on issues such as 
segregation or busing or gay marriage in that traditional arguments of Ingroup, in the former 
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case, and Purity, in the latter, are challenged by arguments built upon notions of Fairness or 
Harm.  
What we do not know is if this generational effect keeps cycling with regard to morally-
charged issues; that is, as cohorts get older, they find more appeal in Authority, Purity, and 
Ingroup concerns whereas the upcoming young people are more open to Harm and Fairness 
arguments. This type of effect may be particularly salient to policy entrepreneurs or political 
campaigns as older individuals tend to be more politically involved. It is also likely that younger 
generations of Americans will continue to diversify by race/ethnicity and religious affiliation, 
leading to a disruption in how we understand conservative Foundations like Purity and Authority 
and the relationship to the conservative Republican Party. Young people of color may 
demonstrate similar religious and moral leanings as their white counterparts, but the current 
direction of white identity fused with Christian nationalism politics (Whitehead, Perry and Baker 
2018; Jardina 2019) suggests that these peers may interpret Moral Foundation links to political 
attitudes and partisanship in different ways. For example, Ingroup/Loyalty preferences may lead 
Latin(x) Americans to prefer more progressive immigration reform while these same attitudes 
would drive white Americans to restrictive immigration policies. In sum, morality politics are 
dependent not only on bedrock principles or religious beliefs, but also political context and group 
membership.  
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